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Abstract: Effectiveness of information security of APCS (automated process control systems), as well as of 
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems, depends on data transmission’s protection technologies 
applied on transport environment’s components. This article investigates the problem of detecting attacks on WSN 
(wireless sensor networks) of SCADA systems. As the result of analytical studies the authors developed the detailed 
classification of external attacks on sensor networks and brought the detailed description of attacking impacts on 
components of SCADA systems in accordance with selected directions of attacks. Reviewed the methods of 
intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks of SCADA systems and functions of WIDS (wireless intrusion 
detection systems). Noticed the role of anthropogenic factors in internal security threats. 
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Introduction.  
           Effectiveness of solving problems of 
information security of APCS and SCADA systems 
mainly depends on data transmission’s protection 
technologies applied on transport environment’s 
components. 
SCADA systems use a wired or wireless sensor 
networks as a transport environment for gathering 
telemetry data and sending commands to executing 
devices [1, 2]. 
Because of the transition from wired to wireless 
networking technologies for the construction of 
sensor networks for gathering telemetry data, the 
quality of such protection [3] is determined not only 
by hardware and software solutions for industrial 
controllers and sensor nodes, but also by the chosen 
principles of their information interaction in the 
process of synthesis of network topology, routing 
determination and data transfer. 
Traditional information security measures (use 
of sophisticated encryption algorithms, multi-factor 
authentication, antivirus programs, firewalls, etc.) are 
not always applicable due to the limited 
computational and energy resources of sensor nodes 
and WSN as a whole. In addition, manufacturers of 
industrial automation and execution devices are 
developing proprietary protocols, which don’t allow 
implementing security technologies using IPSec, 
SSL, VPN, etc. 
If the SCADA system is set in a large area, for 
example, for monitoring and management of 
distributed engineering services (heat, water, 
electricity and gas supplies) [4, 5], then, as a transport 
environment often used networks of mobile operators 
(modem connections GPRS/3G) with the possibility 
of public access [6, 7]. This effectively provides a 
channel for attacks. 
Therefore, to build an effective ways of 
protecting information in wireless sensor networks it 
is necessary to analyze the possible types of attacks, 
methods of their detection, and reasons of system 
vulnerabilities. Solving these problems was the 
purpose of this article. 
 
Classification of attacks in wireless sensor 
networks.  
The modern trend towards transport 
environment of SCADA systems defines the use of 
self-organizing wireless networks, which feature peer 
equality, dynamically changing topology, the 
possibility of network reconfiguration, self-recovery, 
dynamic routing, etc. 
Currently used principles of data transmission 
in wireless networks provide the possibility of 
making the four types of impacts: interception, 
alteration, destruction and code injection. In 
accordance with the definition of security, all attacks 
on WSN of SCADA systems can be divided into the 
following categories: 
1) Access attacks, which include attempts to 
gain unauthorized access to system resources. 
2) Attacks on privacy, which represent attempts 
to intercept the data transfer in the transport 
environment. 
3) Attacks on integrity, which include the 
generation and transfer of frames to capture and 
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control of the SCADA system, to call faults and 
failures in its work or to prepare other attacks. 
Consider in detail the classification of attacks 
by the directions of impacts and give a detailed 
description of the main types (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1 Classification of attacks by directions of 
impacts 
 
1. Attacks on sensor network of 
SCADA system. 
1.1. Creating active interference in the 
work area of the SCADA system. To create 
permanent noises "white noise" generators are used. 
They operate on the same frequency as the SCADA 
system. A source of that noise can be determined 
using spectrum analyzers and it’s possible to stop the 
attack by locating and eliminating its source [8]. The 
most dangerous are natural (lightning) or artificial 
impulse noises, that can lead not only to a system 
failure, but also damage the sensor nodes and 
industrial controllers. 
1.2. Attacks on HMI (human-machine 
interface) of SCADA system [9]. Unauthorized 
access to the web-interface from a mobile device can 
be carried out in the case of open wireless networks 
or networks with weak authentication. 
1.3. Attacks on WSN addresses 
changing (spoofing), aimed on initiating DoS (Denial 
of Service). We can distinguish two types of such 
attacks: 
1.3.1. Interception of sensor nodes’ 
frames with the purpose of spoofing MAC source and 
destination addresses, which leads to the failure or 
malfunction of the SCADA system. 
1.3.2. Replacement of central coordinator 
to change the address space in configuration of sensor 
network. 
2. Attacks on sensor network’s nodes 
and related devices. 
2.1. Changing the firmware, drivers and 
software of industrial controllers (PLC —
 Programmable Logic Controller) and terminal sensor 
nodes (RFD — Reduced Function Device). Attack 
conducted by scanning PLCs and RFDs to identify 
opportunities of changing preinstalled operating 
system, firmware, drivers and controllers. 
2.2. Injection attacks by spoofing or 
replacement the nodes of WSN, responsible for 
collecting and relaying data in a network (FFD — 
Fully Function Device) to intercept and redirect 
network traffic. The main purpose of such an attack is 
to redirect network traffic to an injected or replaced 
node. Consider the variety of such an attack: 
2.2.1. Compromising the node by 
replacing routes confirmation tickets to redirect 
traffic from the end source-nodes to an injected 
receiver-node [10]. As a result of such replacement, 
the real coordinator stops collecting data from the 
PLCs and sensors, and dispatch service loses control 
of technological processes. 
2.2.2. Router (FFD node) replacement in 
a sensor network aimed to violate the correct 
operation of routing algorithms. Attack can be carried 
out by: 
 creation of a "false" tunnel (on the 
injected router runs a program that copies 
retransmitted frames to transfer them to another 
sensor network, or, conversely, the program, the 
frame control commands from another network); 
 setting filters (on the injected router 
runs a program that filters and destructs retransmitted 
frames on the specified criteria or content); 
 changing routes (on the injected 
router runs a program that changes the contents of 
"Route Record" packets by a given algorithm or 
randomly. 
1.1.1. Replacement of a central 
coordinator of organization’s WSN aimed to run-up 
broadcast storm and to achieve denial of service or to 
fast discharge the power supplies [11]. 
2. Attacks on sensor network’s traffic. 
2.1. Listening of data transmission 
channels. Produced by intercepting and decoding 
network traffic with special utilities (sniffers) for 
subsequent analysis of frames for extracting the 
required information. 
2.2. Attacks with data frames. 
Performed by flooding or by generating "false" 
service or data frames or replace the contents of 
captured frames and the subsequent injection into the 
network. Consider the basic options such attacks. 
2.2.1. Injection of malicious code. After 
the injection of malicious code, it focuses on bringing 
malfunction to the executing devices, the entire 
network or on changing the parameters of 
technological processes. Injection into the network 
routers a self-replicating worm leads to infection and 
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transformation of all nodes to bot-net, whose nodes 
generate data frames to increase the reaction time of 
the network, producing faults and failures (distributed 
DoS attack [12, 13]). 
2.2.2. Frames filtering and selective 
forwarding. Produced by injecting into network a 
special type of software or hardware filters that 
intercept data frames, filter them, and may perform a 
custom broadcasts. Effectiveness of the attack 
increases with its integration with the "funnel" attack. 
2.2.3. Flooding attacks by generating 
"false" service or data and broadcasts: 
 cloning and broadcast the data 
frames (performed by intercepting and repeatedly 
reproducing the same data frames followed by 
broadcasting on the network to achieve input buffers 
overflow and network failures; 
 generation and broadcast frames of 
polling units and HELLO-frames to achieve failures 
of network resources (creating and sending in the 
network set HELLO-frames with non-existent 
addresses of nodes, it’s possible to make an image of 
"non-existent" area of the sensor network; 
 synthesis of "virtual" source-nodes 
to broadcast route packets from them (routing DdoS 
attack, here is exploited the weakness of Source-
Routing technology if it’s used in centralized SCADA 
systems with one coordinator and gateway —
excessive network load with broadcast routing 
traffic). 
 
Intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks of 
SCADA systems.  
There are few general traditional techniques aimed to 
detect attacks on transport network media [14, 15]. 
All of them include the following procedures: 
 identification and validation of 
non-standard network traffic; 
 periodic inspection of privileges 
and authorizations for personnel access to specific 
information resources of SCADA system; 
 disabling the unused protocols and 
services; 
 disabling the remote access and 
control to the network nodes and applications; 
 periodically scans of network 
interfaces and drivers; 
 timely software updates for nodes 
from trusted source. 
There are three ways to detect attacks in 
networks: 
1. Detection by the signatures. The signature 
defines the characteristics (profiles) of previously 
committed attacks. During the scanning reveals a 
coincidence of signatures and notification is made. 
However, this method does not reveal the attack with 
new (unknown) signatures. 
2. Detection of the anomalous behavior. Attack 
detection occurs at identifying abnormal behavior of 
the network node or deviations from its normal 
operation. The disadvantage of this approach is that 
incorrect behaving node may be affected by other 
factors that are not related to the attacks, such as 
software, hardware or sensor failure. 
3. Combined detection by the specifications. 
This method combines the two previous ones to 
reduce their shortcomings. 
WIDS (Wireless Intrusion Detection System) is 
a software and hardware solution, which consists of 
software agents that perform the function of 
collecting, processing and analyzing network traffic 
packets. Agents interact with the server, transmitting 
captured packets to it. Server processes the received 
data to detect attack signatures and anomalous 
behavior of network nodes, as well as responding to 
events. Thus, WIDS combines signature and 
behavioral ways, and relates to the third method. In 
operation, WIDS performs monitoring and analysis 
of traffic in sensor network. Its functionality includes 
the following standard procedures. 
1. Analysis of the topology of WSN. 
2. Determination of WSN’s vulnerabilities. 
3. Compilation and maintenance of lists of 
network nodes. These lists are generated on the basis 
of network traffic analysis and retrieval of MAC- 
addresses of the network nodes from captured frames. 
The resulting lists in the future actually allow 
detecting the appearance in the network new 
"foreign" potentially dangerous nodes. 
4. Detecting and countering attacks in WSN. At 
the moment, the number of detected attacks in WSN 
is far less than the number of detected attacks in 
wired networks, as it is limited only by the analysis 
of traffic data on the data link layer of the OSI model. 
The result of the detection of the attack is the 
administrator's notification of potential problems in 
different ways (via email, SMS messages, etc.) and 
event logging for auditing. 
5. Locating the source of the attack and its 
suppression. WIDS can use such mechanisms of 
repression, as the implementation of DoS attacks on 
attacker’s node, blocking the attacking agent by 
active network equipment. Locating the source of 
attacks means detection of the coordinates of the 
device that violates security policy by the 
trilateration, multilateration or triangulation 
technologies. 
6. Control of security policy. Based on the 
analysis of the network nodes list in order to detect 
changes in the policies set by the administrator. An 
audit can detect the appearance of unauthorized nodes 
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and applications, violations of traffic protection 
policy. 
7. Performing controlled invasion tests through 
existing vulnerabilities of SCADA system and its 
components by specific exploits. 
8. Monitoring wireless network capacity and 
network response time. In the process of monitoring, 
WIDS can monitor the physical and data link layers 
of the network, and identify problems such as: 
 overload of channel, node or 
network, 
 a sharp increase in the number of 
data frames received by the coordinator, routers and 
end nodes, 
 reduction of power of radio signals, 
 sharp increase in the broadcast 
service or routing frames, 
 overlap with neighbor networks, 
 reduction in network bandwidth for 
no apparent reason, 
 dramatic increase of route search 
time, 
 sharp increase of server 
applications’ reaction time to client requests, 
 increase of collisions in data 
channels, 
 appearance of new network nodes, 
 reduction of the data transmission 
rate, 
 overload the network nodes and the 
network as a whole, 
 overflow of buffer memory nodes, 
denial of service, etc. 
On the basis of analysis of the results of such 
monitoring by persons responsible for the 
information security, the necessary decisions may be 
concluded and appropriate operational and long-term 
measures may be implemented. 
 
Conclusion.  
          Despite the fairly large number of possible 
attacks on wireless sensor networks and SCADA 
systems, the most dangerous are the internal 
anthropogenic threats to information security, which 
include: 
 unintentional personnel actions that 
create the auspicious conditions for external attacks 
by hackers, 
 intentional ignoring the 
requirements of information security by staff that 
serving SCADA system, 
 the lack of qualification of 
personnel in the field of information technologies and 
implementation of methods of information security. 
Unlike external intruder, the staff of the 
enterprise has the great opportunities for attacks to 
infect and spread malicious code on the sensor 
network. Information security problems often caused 
not so much by external attacks, but more as non-
compliance with staff regulations and rules of the 
enterprise information security policy. Managers and 
other staff of the enterprise may ignore their duties 
and in the "free" time do the Internet "surfing", social 
networking, and playing computer games. The result 
may be an unauthorized PC infection by computer 
viruses, Trojan horses and worms, which then may 
penetrate into the sensor networks. This explains the 
fact that viruses and worms like Stuxnet often present 
in industrial systems, and the fact that their presence 
is normally hidden by staff and managers, as the 
disclosure of this information will lead all the staff 
and management to the detailed inspection and then 
to subsequent negative consequences for them. In 
addition, the finding of the infection in the SCADA 
system may cause a need of hard reset to clean the 
virus and will stop the most of enterprise’s processes, 
but it is not always feasible from an economic 
standpoint.  
Also, the lack of qualifications of personnel 
which works with PLCs and SCADA systems 
requires the involvement of outside experts to 
identify and correct software changes in controllers, 
because after cleaning the system it’s necessary to be 
ensured that the programs and settings in the 
controllers [16] correspond to the values required for 
the proper functioning of complex of industrial 
automation. 
It is well known that the human factor is the 
main reason of deviations from normal operation 
status in various technical systems. This requires 
special attention to the establishment and 
maintenance of appropriate technical regulations. 
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